A Derivation of Expected Utility Maximization in the Context of a Game

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A Derivation of Expected Utility Maximization in the Context of a Game

Author Info

Itzhak Gilboa (Tel Aviv University)
David Schmeidler () (Tel Aviv University)

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Abstract

A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature's strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies). We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly represented by expected utility maximization with respect to an almost-unique state-dependent utility, that is, a matrix assigning real numbers to act-state pairs. As opposed to a utility function that is derived in another context, the utility matrix derived in the game will incorporate all psychological or sociological determinants of well-being that result from the very fact that the outcomes are obtained in a given game.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1342.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1342

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Article
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 2003. "A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 172-182, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Gilboa, I. & Schmeidler, D., 2001. "A Derivation of Expected Utility Maximization in the Context of a Game," Papers 2001-18, Tel Aviv.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

Cited by:
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Chambers, Christopher P. & Hayashi, Takashi, 2008. "Choice and individual welfare," Working Papers 1286, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]

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