Economics and Language
AbstractArising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas for social scientists that should help to encourage a fundamental rethinking of many of the underlying assumptions in economic theory and game theory. As a postscript two economists, Tilman Borgers (University College London) and Bart Lipman (University of Wisconsin, Madison), and a logician, Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation and Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information) offer comments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 666156000000000654.
Date of creation: 17 Mar 2005
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Other versions of this item:
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2000. "Economics and Language," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number lang1.
- Rubinstein,Ariel, 2000. "Economics and Language," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521789905.
- Rubinstein,Ariel, 2000. "Economics and Language," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521593069.
- Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General
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- Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell, 2007. "Decentralized learning from failure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 504-523, March.
- Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "On the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000166, UCLA Department of Economics.
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- Estrada, Fernando, 2010. "The rhetoric of economics," MPRA Paper 35030, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2011.
- Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2009. "Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-255, May.
- O’Callaghan, Patrick, 2011. "Context and Decision: Utility on a Union of Mixture Spaces," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 973, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Carl T. Bergstrom & Rustom Antia & Szabolcs Sz‡mad— & Michael Lachmann, 2001. "The Peacock, the Sparrow, and the Evolution of Human Language," Working Papers 01-05-027, Santa Fe Institute.
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