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Economics and Language

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  • Ariel Rubinstein

Abstract

This paper is the Schwartz Memorial Lecture, delivered at Kellogg, Northwestern University in May 1998. The lecture introduces some ideas about the possible use of tools taken from the economics literature to explain language phenomena. Two specific issues are discussed: From the domain of semantics -- why linear orderings are so common in natural language; and from the domain of pragmatics -- why arguments and counterarguments are treated asymmetrically.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 666156000000000654.

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Date of creation: 17 Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000654

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Cited by:
  1. Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Hernández, Penélope & Urbano, Amparo & Vila, José E., 2012. "Pragmatic languages with universal grammars," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 738-752.
  3. Levy, David M. & Peart, Sandra J., 2004. "Statistical prejudice: from eugenics to immigrants," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 5-22, March.
  4. Birger Wernerfelt, 2004. "Organizational Languages," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 461-472, 09.
  5. Carl T. Bergstrom & Rustom Antia & Szabolcs Sz‡mad— & Michael Lachmann, 2001. "The Peacock, the Sparrow, and the Evolution of Human Language," Working Papers 01-05-027, Santa Fe Institute.
  6. Urs Birchler, 2002. "Poets as consultants? Economic contract theory in German literature," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 2002-10, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  7. Marco, Mariotti & Roberto, Veneziani, 2012. "Opportunities as chances: maximising the probability that everybody succeeds," MPRA Paper 41884, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A., 2010. "The Computational Complexity of Rationalizing Behavior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 356-363, May.
  9. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "On the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000166, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2009. "Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-255, May.
  11. Levy, David M., 2004. "Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science: Philip Mirowski, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 423-431, March.
  12. O’Callaghan, Patrick, 2011. "Context and Decision: Utility on a Union of Mixture Spaces," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 973, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  13. Michael Lachmann & Carl T. Bergstrom & Szabolcs Számadó, 2000. "The Death of Costly Signalling?," Working Papers 00-12-074, Santa Fe Institute.
  14. Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Discussion papers 05018, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  15. Beigman, Eyal, 2010. "Simple games with many effective voters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 15-22, January.
  16. Devetag, Giovanna & Warglien, Massimo, 2008. "Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 364-382, March.
  17. Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006.
  18. Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell, 2007. "Decentralized learning from failure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 504-523, March.
  19. Muchlinski, Elke, 2011. "Die Rezeption der John Maynard Keynes Manuskripte von 1904 bis 1911. Anregungen für die deutschsprachige Diskussion," Discussion Papers 2011/7, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  20. Estrada, Fernando, 2010. "The rhetoric of economics," MPRA Paper 35030, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2011.
  21. Rubinstein, Ariel & Glazer, Jacob, 2006. "A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 395-410, December.

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