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Economics and Language

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  • Rubinstein,Ariel

Abstract

Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas for social scientists that should help to encourage a fundamental rethinking of many of the underlying assumptions in economic theory and game theory. As a postscript two economists, Tilman Borgers (University College London) and Bart Lipman (University of Wisconsin, Madison), and a logician, Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation and Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information) offer comments.

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Bibliographic Info

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This book is provided by Cambridge University Press in its series Cambridge Books with number 9780521593069 and published in 2000.

Order: http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521593069
Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521593069

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Cited by:
  1. Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell, 2007. "Decentralized learning from failure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 504-523, March.
  2. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "On the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000166, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Levy, David M., 2004. "Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science: Philip Mirowski, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 423-431, March.
  4. Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Discussion papers 05018, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  5. Devetag, Giovanna & Warglien, Massimo, 2008. "Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 364-382, March.
  6. Wernerfelt, Birger, 2003. "Organizational Languages," Working papers 4278-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel & Glazer, Jacob, 2006. "A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 395-410, December.
  8. Beigman, Eyal, 2010. "Simple games with many effective voters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 15-22, January.
  9. Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  10. Levy, David M. & Peart, Sandra J., 2004. "Statistical prejudice: from eugenics to immigrants," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 5-22, March.
  11. Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006.
  12. Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A., 2010. "The Computational Complexity of Rationalizing Behavior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 356-363, May.
  13. Marco Mariotti & Roberto Veneziani, 2012. "Opportunities as chances: maximising the probability that everybody succeeds," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2012-09, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  14. Michael Lachmann & Carl T. Bergstrom & Szabolcs Számadó, 2000. "The Death of Costly Signalling?," Working Papers 00-12-074, Santa Fe Institute.
  15. Estrada, Fernando, 2010. "The rhetoric of economics," MPRA Paper 35030, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2011.
  16. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2009. "Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-255, May.
  17. O’Callaghan, Patrick, 2011. "Context and Decision: Utility on a Union of Mixture Spaces," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 973, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  18. Carl T. Bergstrom & Rustom Antia & Szabolcs Sz‡mad— & Michael Lachmann, 2001. "The Peacock, the Sparrow, and the Evolution of Human Language," Working Papers 01-05-027, Santa Fe Institute.

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