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Context-dependent voting and political ambiguity

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  • Callander, Steven
  • Wilson, Catherine H.

Abstract

In recent decades psychologists have shown that the standard model of individual choice is often violated. One regularly observed violation is that choices are influenced by the decision context. To incorporate these effects into politics, we introduce a theory of context-dependent voting and apply it to the puzzle of why candidates are so frequently ambiguous in their policy pronouncements. We show that context-dependent voters develop a taste for ambiguity, even when they evaluate distances quadratically and exhibit traditional risk aversion. Turning to aggregate effects, we incorporate context-dependent voting into a model of electoral competition and show that strategic candidates respond in equilibrium to context-dependent voters by offering ambiguous platforms, thereby affecting the policy outcome.

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  • Callander, Steven & Wilson, Catherine H., 2008. "Context-dependent voting and political ambiguity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 565-581, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:3-4:p:565-581
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    Cited by:

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    2. Azrieli, Yaron, 2011. "Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 545-553.
    3. Millner, Antony & Ollivier, Hélène & Simon, Leo, 2020. "Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    4. Ben Lockwood & James Rockey, 2020. "Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(632), pages 2619-2648.
    5. Zhang, Qiaoxi, 2020. "Vagueness in multidimensional proposals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 307-328.
    6. Andreas Hefti & Shuo Liu & Armin Schmutzler, 2022. "Preferences, Confusion and Competition," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(645), pages 1852-1881.
    7. Rothengatter, Marloes, 2016. "Insights in cognitive patterns : Essays on heuristics and identification," Other publications TiSEM 5f812a9d-8968-48b8-8d1b-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T., 2017. "Modes of ambiguous communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 271-292.
    9. Rivas, Javier & Rockey, James, 2021. "Expressive voting with booing and cheering: Evidence from Britain," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    10. Lockwood, Ben, 2017. "Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(4), pages 471-501, February.
    11. Thomas Fujiwara & Carlos Sanz, 2020. "Rank Effects in Bargaining: Evidence from Government Formation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(3), pages 1261-1295.
    12. Thomas Fujiwara & Carlos Sanz, 2017. "Norms in bargaining: evidence from government formation in Spain," Working Papers 1741, Banco de España.
    13. Yasushi Asako, 2019. "Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 626-641, October.
    14. Benjamin Lockwood, 2015. "Voter Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability," CESifo Working Paper Series 5415, CESifo.
    15. Sturm, Silke, 2019. "Political Competition: How to Measure Party Strategy in Direct Voter Communication using Social Media Data?," Hamburg Discussion Papers in International Economics 1, University of Hamburg, Department of Economics.
    16. Yasushi Asako, 2015. "Campaign promises as an imperfect signal: How does an extreme candidate win against a moderate candidate?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 613-649, October.
    17. Sivan Frenkel, 2014. "Competence and ambiguity in electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 219-234, April.

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