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Expressive Voting

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  • Alexander A. Schuessler

Abstract

For more than 40 years, rational choice theorists have noted that some voters may be expressively motivated. Their approaches generally have lacked a theoretical foundation with which such expressive motivation could be justified, and formalization typically has not gone beyond adding a non-instrumental utility term in a model of instrumental returns. I draw on social theory and anthropology to provide a microfoundation for expressive voting and propose an `economy' of expressive incentives, seeking out equilibrium conditions. This approach generates predictions about voter choice and turnout that are consistent with empirical evidence of electoral behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander A. Schuessler, 2000. "Expressive Voting," Rationality and Society, , vol. 12(1), pages 87-119, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:87-119
    DOI: 10.1177/104346300012001005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dittmann, Ingolf & Kübler, Dorothea & Maug, Ernst & Mechtenberg, Lydia, 2014. "Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 17-38.
    2. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2005. "Beyond outcomes: measuring procedural utility," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 90-111, January.
    3. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2001. "Beyond Bentham – Measuring Procedural Utility," CESifo Working Paper Series 492, CESifo.
    4. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Melvin Stephens Jr., 2013. "Employment, Wages, and Voter Turnout," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 111-143, October.

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