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On minimal morals

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  • Kirchgässner, Gebhard

Abstract

I define and classify moral (or altruistic) behaviour and discuss the necessity of moral behaviour for the functioning of a market economic and a democratic political order. I also evaluate claims that moral behaviour is unnecessary. Moral behaviour can only be stable if certain conditions hold, including most importantly that moral requirements for citizens not be too high; only a minimum standard of morality can be demanded if many citizens are expected to comply. Finally, I point to some problems of relying on moral behaviour.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 26 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 330-339

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:3:p:330-339

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

Related research

Keywords: Moral behaviour Intrinsic motivation Voluntary contribution to public goods Low-cost decisions;

References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Brennan, Geoffrey & Brooks, Michael, 2011. "On the ‘cashing out’ hypothesis and ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 601-610.
  2. Bauer, Thomas K. & Bredtmann, Julia & Schmidt, Christoph M., 2013. "Time vs. money — The supply of voluntary labor and charitable donations across Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 80-94.
  3. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg, 2014. "Group efforts when performance is determined by the “best shot”," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 333-373, June.
  4. Kirchgässner, Gebhard, 2012. "Sanfter Paternalismus, meritorische Güter, und der normative Individualismus," Economics Working Paper Series 1217, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  5. Caruso, Raul & Schneider, Friedrich, 2011. "The socio-economic determinants of terrorism and political violence in Western Europe (1994–2007)," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(S1), pages S37-S49.

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