An Economic Model of Regime Change: Freedom as a Public Good
AbstractThis paper analyzes regime change via a peaceful revolution. Under these circumstances, peaceful manifestations of unrest reach a point at which the prevailing political system collapses and is replaced by a system that provides more freedom. Such regime change occurred in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. It is shown that the successful quest for freedom may be explained as a dynamic game. The game has a unique strong equilibrium--that is, a Nash equilibrium robust against mass defections--that arises in consequence of a trigger strategy that is similar to the tit-for-tat strategy in a repeated prisoners' dilemma. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 79 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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