On the ‘cashing out’ hypothesis and ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policies
AbstractIn the literature on paternalism that has grown out of the behavioural economics ‘revolution’, a distinction is drawn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policies. Although this hard/soft distinction seems to be motivated by the thought that the two policy types might have different implications for individual liberty, there is a claim that ‘hard’ policies are normatively superior to ‘soft’ for ‘efficiency’ reasons. We show, by appeal to an esteem-based model of ‘soft’ policy that this claim is not valid in general. We also expose a number of conceptual mistakes in what many seem to have identified as the normative implications of behavioural economics.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 27 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544
‘Hard’ and ‘soft’ paternalism; Social esteem; Israeli kindergarten puzzle; Emotional tax;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hollander, Heinz, 1990. "A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1157-67, December.
- Glaeser, Edward L., 2006. "Paternalism and Psychology," Working Paper Series rwp06-006, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Bykvist, Krister, 2010. "Can Unstable Preferences Provide A Stable Standard Of Well-Being?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(01), pages 1-26, March.
- Cooter, Robert D., 1998. "Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the "Bad Man" of Holmes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt5dj8m2kf, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, 2003. "The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-31.
- Brennan, Geoffrey & Pettit, Philip, 2004. "The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199246489.
- Stigler, George J & Becker, Gary S, 1977. "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 76-90, March.
- Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000.
"A Fine is a Price,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Geoffrey Brennan & Michael Brooks, 2007. "Esteem-based contributions and optimality in public goods supply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 457-470, March.
- Kirchgässner, Gebhard, 2010. "On minimal morals," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 330-339, September.
- Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 1992. "Towards a theory of low-cost decisions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 305-320, May.
- Schnellenbach, Jan, 2012. "Nudges and norms: On the political economy of soft paternalism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 266-277.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.