The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law
AbstractWe argue that legislation can generate compliance expressively, independently of deterrence. The Condorcet jury theorem implies that, in certain circumstances, the legislative process aggregates the private information of legislators to reach a decision superior to that of any individual legislator. Citizens may update their beliefs about issues the legislation addresses even though individual legislators are no better informed than individual citizens, and change their behavior in the direction of greater compliance. We first use a model with sincere voting and then consider strategic voting, position-taking preferences, lobbying, and legislative institutions. We use a public smoking ban for illustration, and propose an experimental test. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal American Law and Economics Review.
Volume (Year): 5 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://www.aler.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Richard McAdams & Janice Nadler, . "A Third Model of Legal Compliance: Testing for Expressive Effects in a Hawk/Dove Game," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy yale_lepp-1029, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
- Dhammika Dharmapala & Thomas J. Miceli, 2012.
"Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence,"
Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
2012-37, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Dhammika Dharmapala & Thomas J. Miceli, 2003. "Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2003-37, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Brennan, Geoffrey & Brooks, Michael, 2011. "On the â€˜cashing outâ€™ hypothesis and â€˜softâ€™ and â€˜hardâ€™ policies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 601-610.
- Frank Fagan, 2013. "After the sunset: the residual effect of temporary legislation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 209-226, August.
- Roger Congleton, 2007. "Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 333-352, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.