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• Roger D. Congleton

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 132 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 333-352
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:333-352

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Related research

Keywords: Jury theorem; Rational ignorance; Elections; Delegation; Expert’s dilemma; Information aggregation; Yardstick competition; Informational policies; Liberal institutions; Effectiveness of democracy; Majority rule; Simulated elections;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
   Other versions:
   • Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, . "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," Working Papers 100, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
   • Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
2. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
   Other versions:
   • Tim Besley, 2002. "Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States," IFS Working Papers W02/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
   • Besley, Timothy J. & Case, Anne, 2002. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 3498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, 2003. "The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-31.
4. Wit, Jorgen, 1998. "Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 364-376, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Congleton, Roger D., 1984. "Committees and rent-seeking effort," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 197-209, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Lohmann, Susanne, 1994. "Information Aggregation through Costly Political Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 518-30, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.
   Other versions:
   • Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
8. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, . "Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution," IEW - Working Papers iewwp167, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2003. "Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution," CREMA Working Paper Series 2003-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
9. George J. Stigler, 1961. "The Economics of Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 213. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer:, . "Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland," IEW - Working Papers iewwp119, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2004. "Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics? -- Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(1_2), pages 31-59, 04. [Downloadable!]
11. SALMON, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralization as an incentive scheme," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
    Other versions:
    • Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.

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