Persuasion, psychology and public choice
AbstractThere has been a division of labor in the “behavioral sciences”. This is perhaps most striking in two of the largest behavioral disciplines, economics and psychology. Since 1990, a number of economists have crossed this boundary. But James Buchanan was one of the first economists to take the problem of moral intuitions and the origins of preferences seriously, and to treat them analytically.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 80 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Public choice; Psychology; Rational choice theory; Behaviorism;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B3 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals
- K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
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