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Party cues and yardstick voting

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  • Geys, Benny
  • Vermeir, Jan

Abstract

Politicians within any given party generally exhibit a degree similarity in terms of (political) viewpoints. Moreover, they are often constrained to follow general party lines on certain policy issues. Finally, they may be more likely to mimic one another than politicians from another party. Hence, parties provide important cues on how politicians will act once elected. The present paper assesses the implications of such party cues for the traditional model of yardstick voting (where voters use what they observe in neighbouring jurisdictions to judge the performance of their incumbent). It is shown that the information content of what happens in neighbouring jurisdictions differs depending on whether or not the same party governs this jurisdiction. More specifically, we find that voters might still take neighbouring jurisdictions into account, but should distinguish between jurisdictions where the same or a different party is in power. The results of the model are in line with recent empirical observations in Sweden and the United States.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 24 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 470-477

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:2:p:470-477

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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Cited by:
  1. Kiss, Áron, 2012. "Divisive politics and accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 208-214.
  2. Claudio Parés, 2010. "Political Careers Concerns and Political Parties," Working Papers, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción 02-2010, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción.
  3. Raffaella Santolini, 2009. "The political trend in local government tax setting," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 125-134, April.
  4. Raffaella Santolini, 2008. "A spatial cross-sectional analysis of political trends in Italian municipalities," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 87(3), pages 431-451, 08.
  5. Geys, Benny, 2012. "Success and failure in electoral competition: Selective issue emphasis under incomplete issue ownership," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-102, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  6. Marcel Gérard & Laurent van Malderen, 2012. "Tax Interaction among Walloon Municipalities: Is there Room for Yardstick Competition, Intellectual Trend and Partisan Monopoly Effect?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4025, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Pierre Salmon, 2013. "Horizontal competition in multilevel governmental settings," Working Papers hal-00830876, HAL.
  8. Laurent Van Malderen & Marcel Gérard, 2012. "Tax Interaction Among Walloon Municipalities: Is There Room For Partisan Monopoly Effect?," ERSA conference papers ersa12p1051, European Regional Science Association.

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