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The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs

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  • Philip Jones
  • John Hudson

Abstract

This paper explores the proposition that political parties reduce the ‘transaction costs’ of electoral participation. Political parties provide a low cost signal of a candidate's policies and personal characteristics and, in this way, reduce voters' information costs. With reference to ‘transaction cost economics’, political parties offer an ‘implicit contract’ between voters and politicians and thereby reduce the scope for opportunism by politicians. This impact on transaction costs is important in any evaluation of public policy towards political parties. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

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  • Philip Jones & John Hudson, 1998. "The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 175-189, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:94:y:1998:i:1:p:175-189
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1004924417001
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    Cited by:

    1. Benny Geys & Jan Vermeir, 2014. "Party Cues In Elections Under Multilevel Governance: Theory And Evidence From Us States," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1029-1058, August.
    2. Ernesto Dal Bo & Rafael Di Tella, 2003. "Capture by Threat," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1123-1152, October.
    3. Claudio Parés, 2010. "Political Careers Concerns and Political Parties," Working Papers 02-2010, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción.
    4. Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan, 2008. "Party cues and yardstick voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 470-477, June.
    5. Glenn Furton & Adam Martin, 2019. "Beyond market failure and government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 197-216, January.
    6. Daniele, Gianmarco & Galletta, Sergio & Geys, Benny, 2020. "Abandon ship? Party brands and politicians' responses to a political scandal," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    7. Ivo Bischoff, 2005. "Party competition in a heterogeneous electorate: The role of dominant-issue voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 221-243, January.
    8. Raffaella Santolini, 2008. "A spatial cross‐sectional analysis of political trends in Italian municipalities," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 87(3), pages 431-451, August.
    9. Marcel Gérard & Laurent van Malderen, 2012. "Tax Interaction among Walloon Municipalities: Is there Room for Yardstick Competition, Intellectual Trend and Partisan Monopoly Effect?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4025, CESifo.
    10. Emanuel V. Towfigh & Sebastian J. Goerg & Andreas Glöckner & Philip Leifeld & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Sophie Bade & Carlos Kurschilgen, 2016. "Do direct-democratic procedures lead to higher acceptance than political representation?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 47-65, April.
    11. Geys, Benny, 2012. "Success and failure in electoral competition: Selective issue emphasis under incomplete issue ownership," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-102, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    12. Emanuel Towfigh & Andreas Glöckner & Sebastian Goerg & Philip Leifeld & Carlos Kurschilgen & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Sophie Bade, 2013. "Does Political Representation through Parties Decrease Voters' Acceptance of Decisions?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

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