Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dhammika Dharmapala

    (University of Illinois)

  • Thomas J. Miceli

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures in criminal investigations. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to require that police obtain a warrant prior to search and that illegally seized evidence be excluded from trial. A consensus has developed in the law and economics literature that tort liability for police officers would be a superior means of deterring unreasonable searches. We argue that this conclusion depends on the assumption of truth-seeking police, and develop a game-theoretic model to compare the two remedies when some police officers (“bad” types) are willing to plant evidence in order to obtain convictions, while other police (“good” types) are not (where this type is private information). We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the asymmetric-information game between the police and a court that seeks to minimize error costs in deciding whether to convict or acquit suspects. In this framework, we show that the exclusionary rule with a warrant requirement leads to superior outcomes (relative to tort liability) in terms of the truth-finding function of courts, because the warrant requirement can reduce the scope for “bad” types of police to plant evidence. JEL Classification: K14, K42 Key words: Exclusionary rule, Fourth Amendment, search and seizure

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2012-37.pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2012-37.

as in new window
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2012-37

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Connecticut 341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063
Phone: (860) 486-4889
Fax: (860) 486-4463
Web page: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1988. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 713-28, September.
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 6945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Atkins, Raymond A & Rubin, Paul H, 2003. "Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 157-79, April.
  4. Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, 2003. "The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-31.
  5. Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 94-06, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  6. Hugo Mialon & Sue Mialon, 2008. "The Economics of Search Warrants," Emory Economics 0810, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  7. Grossman, Gene M & Katz, Michael L, 1983. "Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 749-57, September.
  8. Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas, 2004. "Black Sheep and Walls of Silence," IZA Discussion Papers 1171, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Hugo Mialon, 2004. "An Economic Theory of the Fifth Amendment," Emory Economics 0409, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  10. Schrag, Joel & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1994. "Crime and Prejudice: The Use of Character Evidence in Criminal Trials," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 319-42, October.
  11. Juan Dubra, 2004. "Why do Good Cops Defend Bad Cops?," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 342, Econometric Society.
  12. Benjamin Lester & Nicola Persico & Ludo Visschers, 2012. "Information Acquisition and the Exclusion of Evidence in Trials," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 163-182.
  13. Bowles, Roger & Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 75-87, March.
  14. Miceli, Thomas J, 1990. "Optimal Prosecution of Defendants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 189-201, Spring.
  15. Sue H. Mialon, 2008. "The Effects of the Fourth Amendment: An Economic Analysis," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 22-44, May.
  16. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Hugo Mialon & Sue Mialon, 2008. "The Economics of Search Warrants," Emory Economics 0810, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  2. Mühlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas, 2005. "Black Sheep and Walls of Silence," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 56, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2012-37. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kasey Kniffin).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.