This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Ambiguity in Election Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Enriqueta Aragonés
Andrew Postlewaite

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/364.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Whole Paper
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 364.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:364

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Ambiguity; elections;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alesina, Alberto & Cukierman, Alex, 1990. "The Politics of Ambiguity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 829-50, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Enriqueta Aragonés & Zvika Neeman, 1994. "Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition," Economics Working Papers 162, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 1996. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1990. "A model of electoral competition with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 309-325, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1969. "Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 83(4), pages 696-703, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lizzeri, Alessandro, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(4), pages 909-28, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jean-François Laslier, 2003. "Ambiguity in electoral competition," Working Papers hal-00242944_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Thomas Jensen, 2007. "Projection Effects and Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers 07-12, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Thomas Jensen, 2005. "Can Ambiguity in Electoral Competition be Explained by Projection Effects in Voters' Perceptions?," Discussion Papers 05-25, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marcus Berliant & Hideo Konishi, 2004. "Salience: Agenda Choices by Competing Candidates," Game Theory and Information 0407003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Juan Carlos Berganza, 2000. "Politicians, voters and electoral processes: an overview," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(3), pages 501-543, September. [Downloadable!]
  6. Guido, Cataife, 2007. "The pronouncements of paranoid politicians," MPRA Paper 4473, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alberto F. Alesina & Richard T. Holden, 2008. "Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections," NBER Working Papers 14143, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Giuseppe Attanasi, Luca Corazzini, Nikolaos Georgantzis, Francesco Passarelli., 2009. "Risk Aversion, Over-Confidence and Private Information as Determinants of Majority Thresholds," ISLA Working Papers 34, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  9. Giuseppe Attanasi, Luca Corazzini, Francesco Passarelli, 2007. "Voting as a Lottery," ISLA Working Papers 28, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  10. Eric Eyster & Thomas Kittsteiner, 2004. "Party Platforms in Electoral Competition with many constituencies," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse9_2004, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Nov 2004. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You may want to explore EconPapers, which displays the same data as IDEAS in a different way.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.