Ambiguity in election games
AbstractWe construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 364.
Date of creation: Mar 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-03-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1999-03-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-1999-03-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-1999-03-30 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lizzeri, Alessandro, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(4), pages 909-28, October.
- Zeckhauser, Richard, 1969. "Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 83(4), pages 696-703, November.
- Joseph E. Harrington, 1992. "The Revelation Of Information Through The Electoral Process: An Exploratory Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 255-276, November.
- Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, 1987.
"The Politics of Ambiguity,"
NBER Working Papers
2468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Enriqueta Aragones & Zvika Neeman, 1994.
"Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition,"
1083, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., 1990. "A model of electoral competition with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 309-325, April.
- Juan Carlos Berganza, 2000. "Politicians, voters and electoral processes: an overview," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(3), pages 501-543, September.
- Marcus Berliant & Hideo Konishi, 2004.
"Salience: Agenda Choices by Competing Candidates,"
Game Theory and Information
- Jean-François Laslier, 2006.
"Ambiguity in Electoral Competition,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 195-210, May.
- Guido, Cataife, 2007. "The pronouncements of paranoid politicians," MPRA Paper 4473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alberto Alesina & Richard Holden, 2008.
"Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
122247000000002358, David K. Levine.
- Attanasi, Giuseppe & Corazzini, Luca & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Passarelli, Francesco, 2010.
"Risk Aversion, Over-Confidence and Private Information as Determinants of Majority Thresholds,"
TSE Working Papers
09-088, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Giuseppe Attanasi, Luca Corazzini, Nikolaos Georgantzis, Francesco Passarelli., 2009. "Risk Aversion, Over-Confidence and Private Information as Determinants of Majority Thresholds," ISLA Working Papers 34, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Luca CORAZZINI & Nikolaos GEORGANTZIS & Francesco PASSARELLI, 2009. "Risk Aversion, Over-Confidence and Private Information as determinants of Majority Thresholds," LERNA Working Papers 09.26.302, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Weiss, 2005.
"Making Statements and Approval Voting,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1531, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Giuseppe Attanasi, Luca Corazzini, Francesco Passarelli, 2007.
"Voting as a Lottery,"
ISLA Working Papers
28, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Attanasi, Giuseppe & Corazzini, Luca & Passarelli, Francesco, 2010. "Voting as a Lottery," TSE Working Papers 09-116, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2010.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Luca CORAZZINI & Francesco PASSARELLI, 2009. "Voting as a Lottery," LERNA Working Papers 09.27.303, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Eric Eyster & Thomas Kittsteiner, 2004. "Party Platforms in Electoral Competition with many constituencies," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse9_2004, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Nov 2004.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.