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The Structure of Heresthetical Power

Author

Listed:
  • Scott Moser

    (Nuffield College, University of Oxford, scoot.moser@nuffield.ox.ac.uk)

  • John W. Patty

    (Harvard University, jpatty@gov.harvar.edu)

  • Elizabeth Maggie Penn

    (Harvard University, epenn@gov.harvard.edu)

Abstract

This article considers manipulation of collective choice — in such environments, a potential alternative is powerful only to the degree that its introduction can affect the collective decision. Using the Banks set (Banks, 1985), we present and characterize alternatives that can, and those that can not, affect sophisticated collective decision-making. Along with offering two substantive findings about political manipulation and a link between our results and Riker's concept of heresthetic , we define a new tournament solution concept that refines the Banks set, which we refer to as the heresthetically stable set .

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Moser & John W. Patty & Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2009. "The Structure of Heresthetical Power," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 139-159, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:139-159
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629808100761
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. John W. Patty & Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2019. "A defense of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 145-164, April.

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