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Strategic candidacy and voting procedures

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Author Info
DUTTA, Bhaskar
JACKSON, Matthew O.
LE BRETON, Michel

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Abstract

We study the impact of considering the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. First we show that every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity, is open to strategic entry or exit by candidates: there necessarily exists some candidate can affect the outcome by entering or exiting the election, even when they do not win the election. Given that strategic candidacy always matters, we analyze the impact of strategic candidacy effects. We show that the equilibrium set of outcomes of the well-known voting by successive elimination procedure expands in a well-defined way when strategic candidacy is accounted for.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1999011.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1999011

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Hong, Lu, 1998. "Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 201-221, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sen, Amartya K, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(115), pages 307-17, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(1), pages 143-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 255-62, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  1. Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," Working Papers 0206, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Dynamic Farsighted Stability," Discussion Papers 22, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ehlers,Lars & Storcken,Ton, 2001. "Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments," Research Memoranda 006, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings," ISER Discussion Paper 0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bernardo Moreno & M. Socorro Puy, 2003. "The Scoring Rules in an Endogenous Election," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/26, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Geoffroy de Clippel & Camelia Bejan, 2009. "No Profitable Decomposition in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems," Working Papers 2009-6, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Carmelo Rodr?uez-?varez, 2001. "Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 492.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Salvador Barber?Author-Email: salvador.barbera@uab.es & Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 512.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. John A. Weymark, 2000. "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice," Working Papers 0029, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Feb 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Arrow's Theorem for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Research Memoranda 043, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  12. Bernardo Moreno & M. Puy, 2009. "Plurality Rule Works In Three-Candidate Elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 145-162, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Taylor, Curtis & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Public Information and Electoral Bias," Working Papers 05-11, Duke University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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