We present a model of participation in large elections in which the formation of voter groups is endogenous. Partisan citizens decide whether to become leaders (activists) and try to persuade impressionable citizens to vote for the leaders' Â’preferred party. In the (unique) pure strategy equilibrium, the number of leaders favoring each party depends on the cost of activism and the importance of the election. In turn, the expected turnout and the winning margin in an election depend on the number of leaders and the strength of social interactions. The model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the expected turnout and the winning margin in large elections.
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Article provided by Society for Economic Theory in its journal Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 1 (2006) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 461-487 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1995.
"Crime and Social Interactions,"
NBER Working Papers
5026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2006.
"Mediocracy,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
07-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
[Downloadable!]
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Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007.
"Mediocracy,"
NBER Working Papers
12920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006.
"Robust Rational Turnout,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP44, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
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