Robust Rational Turnout
AbstractWe establish that, except for a finite set of common costs of participation, all equilibria of a class of complete information voting games (as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983)) are regular. Thus, all the equilibria of these games (including those exhibiting high turnout rates) are robust to small but arbitrary payoff perturbations, and survive in nearby games with incomplete information about voting costs and/or about the fraction of supporters of the two candidates. We also show that all the equilibria of these complete information games exhibit minimal heterogeneity of behavior, so that the strategies of indifferent players are characterized by at most two probabilities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy in its series Wallis Working Papers with number WP43.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Wallis Institute, Harkness 109B Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
Turnout; Regular Equilibrium.;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-13 (All new papers)
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