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A Location Game On Disjoint Circles

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  • Marcin Dziubinski

    ()

  • Debabrata Datta

    ()

  • Jaideep Roy

    ()

Abstract

Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N > K>= 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They face a resource mobility constraint such that not all N locations can be placed in the rst round. The player with the highest secured area wins the game and otherwise the game ends in a tie. Earlier research has shown that for K = 1, the second mover always has a winning strategy in this game. In this paper we show that with K > 1, the second mover advantage disappears as in this case both players have a tying strategy. We also study a natural variant of this game where the resource mobility constraint is more stringent so that in each round each player chooses a single location where we show that the second mover advantage re-appears. We suggest some Nash equilibrium configurations of locations in both versions of the game.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University in its series CEDI Discussion Paper Series with number 07-15.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edb:cedidp:07-15

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  1. Helios Herrera & César Martinelli, 2006. "Group Formation and Voter Participation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000463, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Economides, Nicholas, 1986. "Minimal and maximal product differentiation in Hotelling's duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 67-71.
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Cited by:
  1. Marcin Dziubiński, 2011. "Location game on disjoint line segments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 231-262, May.
  2. Marcin Konrad Dziubinski, 2008. "Voronoi game on disjoint open curves," Working Papers 591829, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

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