This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Election Closeness and Voter Turnout: Evidence from California Ballot Propositions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
 Matsusaka, John G

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper uses a new data set of 885 California ballot propositions from 1912 through 1990 to test the hypothesis that voter turnout increases as an election becomes closer. Various measures of voter participation are regressed on various measures of election closeness. The main finding is that there is not a systematic relation between closeness and turnout. Two conclusions are drawn: (1) voters are not sensitive to the probability their votes are decisive and (2) other studies that found higher turnout for close elections probably detected an increased mobilization of party elites in tight races. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 76 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 313-34
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:76:y:1993:i:4:p:313-34

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Helios Herrera & César Martinelli, 2006. "Group Formation and Voter Participation," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000463, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Mirabelle Muuls & Dimitra Petropoulou, 2007. "A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College," Economics Series Working Papers 372, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Peter Calcagno & Christopher Westley, . "An Institutional Analysis of Voter Turnout: The Role of Primary Type and the Expressive and Instrumental Voting Hypotheses," Working Papers 1, Department of Economics and Finance, College of Charleston. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Jeffrey Milyo & David M. Primo, 2005. "The Effects of Campaign Finance Laws on Turnout, 1950-2000," Working Papers 0516, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 01 Feb 2006. [Downloadable!]
  6. Mirabelle Muûls & Dimitra Petropoulou, 2008. "A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College," CEP Discussion Papers dp0849, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are NEP reports in over 80 fields that deliver new research to your email.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.