Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
AbstractThis paper considers the problem of implementation for exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets. Agents are assumed to have private information about their endowments. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice rules that are Bayesian implementable by feasible mechanisms for such an environment. We compare our main result to the Nash implementation result derived in an environment of complete information.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 13 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received: 30 September 1994/Accepted: 16 May 1995
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Luis C. Corchon & Matteo Triosi, 2005.
"Implementation With State Dependent Feasible Sets And Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach,"
Economics Working Papers
we057136, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Byungchae Rhee, 2004. "A Characterization of Optimal Feasible Tax Mechanism," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 551, Econometric Society.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999.
"A Crash Course in Implementation Theory,"
1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Sandro Brusco, 1997.
"The Optimal Design of a Market,"
1186, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hong, Lu, 1998. "Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 201-221, June.
- Forges, Françoise, 2006. "Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/166, Paris Dauphine University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.