Just Rewards?Local Politics and Public ResourceAllocation in South India

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Just Rewards?Local Politics and Public ResourceAllocation in South India

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Timothy Besley
Rohini Pande
Vijayendra Rao

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Abstract

This paper uses data on elected village councils in South India to examine thepolitical economy of public resource allocation. We find that the pattern ofpolicy-making reflects politicians' self-interest. Elected councillors benefit fromimproved personal access to public resources. In addition, the headcouncillor's group identity and residence influences public resource allocation.While electoral incentives do not eliminate politician opportunism, votersappear able to use their electoral clout to gain greater access to publicresources.

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Paper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Development Economics Papers with number 49.

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Date of creation: Oct 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cep:stidep:49

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-02-02 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2008-02-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-CWA-2008-02-02 (Central & Western Asia)
NEP-DEV-2008-02-02 (Development)
NEP-PBE-2008-02-02 (Public Economics)
NEP-POL-2008-02-02 (Positive Political Economics)

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Other versions:
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Other versions:
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Other versions:
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Radu Ban & Vijayendra Rao, 2008. "Tokenism or Agency? The Impact of Women’s Reservations on Village Democracies in South India," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56, pages 501-530. [Downloadable!]
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Markus Goldstein & Christopher Udry, 2005. "The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana," Working Papers 929, Economic Growth Center, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Markus Goldstein & Christopher Udry, 2008. "The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 981-1022, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
John A List & Daniel M Sturm, 2006. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1249-1281, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
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Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Vijayendra Rao, 2005. "Participatory Democracy in Action: Survey Evidence from South India," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 648-657, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Lupin Rahman & Vijayendra Rao, 2004. "The Politics of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 416-426, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ruben Enikolopov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," Economics Working Papers 0045, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2003. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3857, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Ruben Enikolopov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," Working Papers w0065, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2008. "The Efficacy of Parochial Politics: Caste, Commitment, and Competence in Indian Local Governments," Working Papers 964, Economic Growth Center, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2008. "The Efficacy of Parochial Politics: Caste, Commitment, and Competence in Indian Local Governments," NBER Working Papers 14335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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