Candidate Stability And Voting Correspondences
AbstractFor each set of candidates at state and each profile of voters' preferences over running candidates a voting corresponsence selects a set of candidates. following Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica 2001) a voting correspondence is candidate stable if a candidate never benefits from withdrawing unilateraly her candidacy. If candidates cannot vote and compare sets of candidates according to their expected utility conditional on some prior probability assessment only dictatorial voting correspondences are candidate stable and unanimous. If the assessments are restricted to be uniform, rules that select the set of best candidates of tww fixed voters are also allowed. We also analyze other domains of preferences fitting extreme attitudes towards risk in which positive results are obtained
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 666.
Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Voting Correspondence ; Candidate Stability ; Preferences over Sets;
Other versions of this item:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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