AbstractAn effectivity function describes the blocking power of coalitions on subsets of alternatives. Given a preference profile, if any coalition blocks an alternative whenever it can, using its own power and making all of its members better off, only alternatives in the core can be reached. In this paper, the author studies the incen tives of the coalitions to use this power truthfully, i.e., to not ma nipulate. Some wellknown cores, among them the core of an exchange ec onomy, are manipulable. The author gives sufficient conditions on an effectivity function that assures its core is nonmanipulable. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 55 (1987)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
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