The Scoring Rules in an Endogenous Election
AbstractPlurality rule, when applied to a fixed agenda setting, is mostly criticized from being capable of choosing an alternative considered as worst by a strict majority. In this paper we consider an endogenous agenda setting with no more than three alternatives. In those equilibria where the Condorcet winner enters the contest, we show, in direct contrast to the fixed agenda case, that Plurality rule is the only scoring rule which always elects the Condorcet winner.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2003/26.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Scoring rules; Citizen-candidate; Condorcet Consistency; Strategic candidacy.;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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