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The Scoring Rules in an Endogenous Election

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Author Info
Bernardo Moreno () (Univ. Málaga)
M. Socorro Puy () (Univ. Málaga)

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Abstract

Plurality rule, when applied to a fixed agenda setting, is mostly criticized from being capable of choosing an alternative considered as worst by a strict majority. In this paper we consider an endogenous agenda setting with no more than three alternatives. In those equilibria where the Condorcet winner enters the contest, we show, in direct contrast to the fixed agenda case, that Plurality rule is the only scoring rule which always elects the Condorcet winner.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2003/26.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_26

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Related research
Keywords: Scoring rules; Citizen-candidate; Condorcet Consistency; Strategic candidacy.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin, 1998. "Choix social positionnel et principe majoritaire," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 51, pages 02, Juillet-S. [Downloadable!]
  2. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  4. Bernardo Moreno & M. Socorro Puy, 2003. "Plurality Rule Works in Three-Candidate Elections," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/09, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O. & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 190-218, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-37, July.
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  1. Bernardo Moreno & M. Puy, 2009. "Plurality Rule Works In Three-Candidate Elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 145-162, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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