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Plurality Rule Works In Three-Candidate Elections

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Author Info
Bernardo Moreno
M. Puy ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-007-9063-1
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 67 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 145-162
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:145-162

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Related research
Keywords: citizen–candidate; condorcet winner; plurality rule; sincere voting; D720; D710;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gehrlein, William V., 1992. "Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-66, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bernardo Moreno & M. Socorro Puy, 2005. "The scoring rules in an endogenous election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 115-125, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Dan Usher, 2005. "Assessing the citizen – candidate model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 43-65, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Palfrey, Thomas R, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(1), pages 139-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-37, July.
    Other versions:
  7. Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin, 1998. "Choix social positionnel et principe majoritaire," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 51, pages 02, Juillet-S. [Downloadable!]
  8. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  9. Saari, Donald G., 1999. "Explaining All Three-Alternative Voting Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 313-355, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bernardo Moreno & M. Socorro Puy, 2005. "The scoring rules in an endogenous election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 115-125, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-5.

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