Bargaining and Voting
AbstractGovernment by majority rule voting requires that compromise be attainable, but not too easily. Little of the nation's business could be transacted without an ability on the part of the legislators and political parties to strike bargains, but government by majority rule voting could not withstand a bargaining equilibrium comparable to the general equilibrium in a competitive economy. Democratic government is designed to foster bargaining where it should be fostered and to impede bargaining where it should be impeded.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1245.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Bargaining; Majority rule voting;
Other versions of this item:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-11-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-11-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2010-11-06 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-11-06 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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