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Equilibrium Agenda Formation

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Author Info

  • Dutta, Bhaskar

    (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi and Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

  • Jackson, Matthew O.

    (California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California)

  • Breton, Michel Le

    (Universite d'Aix-Marseille)

Abstract

We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined. We also show that for such voting rules, if preferences are strict then the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas for voting by successive elimination and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several other settings.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 628.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:628

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Keywords: Agenda ; Equilibrium ; Voting;

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References

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  1. Carmelo Rodr?uez-?varez, 2001. "Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 492.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
  3. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Gasmi, Farid., 1986. "Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 603, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  5. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O. & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 190-218, March.
  7. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
  8. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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Cited by:
  1. Elizabeth Penn, 2006. "The Banks Set in Infinite Spaces," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 531-543, December.
  2. Casella, Alessandra, 2008. "Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Staudigl, Mathias & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2013. "Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79822, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  4. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2012. "Qualitative voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , , vol. 24(4), pages 526-554, October.
  5. Casella, Alessandra, 2011. "Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 46-76, May.
  6. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel & Luis Rayo, 2002. "Democratic Policy Making with Real-Time Agenda Setting: Part 1," NBER Working Papers 8973, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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