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Democratic Policy Making with Real-Time Agenda Setting: Part 1

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Author Info
B. Douglas Bernheim
Antonio Rangel
Luis Rayo

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Abstract

We examine democratic policy-making in a simple institution with real-time agenda setting. Individuals are recognized sequentially. Once recognized, an individual makes a proposal, which is immediately put to a vote. If a proposal passes, it supercedes all previously passed proposals. The policy that emerges from this process is implemented. For some familiar classes of policy spaces with rich distributional politics, we show that the last proposer is effectively a dictator under a variety of natural conditions. Most notably, this occurs whenever a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. Thus, under reasonably general assumptions, control of the final proposal with real-time agenda setting confers as much power as control of the entire agenda.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 8973.

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Date of creation: May 2002
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8973

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D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H0 - Public Economics - - General

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  1. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2000. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 46-79, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Bhaskar Dutta & Matthew O. Jackson & Michel Le Breton, 2004. "Equilibrium agenda formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 21-57, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Lockwood, Ben, 1998. "Distributive Politics and the Benefits of Decentralisation," CSGR Working papers series 10/98, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
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  4. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," Working Papers 1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  6. Stéphane Rottier & Francis Bloch, 2002. "Agenda control in coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 769-788. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Gasmi, Farid., 1986. "Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees," Working Papers 603, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  8. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1984. "Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control," Working Papers 524, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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