A Foundation for Strategic Agenda Voting
AbstractWe offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 607.
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Strategic Voting; Agendas; Committees; Institutions; Axioms;
Other versions of this item:
- Jose Apesteguia & Miguel Ballester & Yusufcan Masatlioglu, 2012. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 1302, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001.
"Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society,
Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-37, July.
- DUTTA, Bhaskar & JACKSON, Matthew O. & LE BRETON, Michel, 1999. "Strategic candidacy and voting procedures," CORE Discussion Papers, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1999011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O. & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 190-218, March.
- Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester & Rosa Ferrer, 2011. "On the Justice of Decision Rules," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 1-16.
- Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
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