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Candidate location and endogenous valence

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  • Zakharov Alexei

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    Abstract

    This paper analyzes the effect that the ability of candidates to increase their valence has on candidate location in the Downsian model of elections. I show that if the candidates can increase valence at a cost after they have selected policy, then the candidates will select different policy platforms in order to avoid spending too much on valence. I then consider the factors that determine the degree of divergence, the amount spent on valence, and the location of the indifferent voter.

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    File URL: https://eerc.ru/default/download/creater/working_papers/file/ab52592147bc096af1c9932b07209ff7daceef1c.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS in its series EERC Working Paper Series with number 05-17e.

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    Date of creation: 29 Dec 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:05-17e

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    Postal: EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS, 13, Yakira Str., suite 332, Kyiv, 04119 Ukraine
    Phone: +38(044)492-8012
    Fax: +1(202)478-1968
    Web page: http://www.eerc.ru

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    Postal: EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS, 13, Yakira Str., suite 332, Kyiv, 04119 Ukraine
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    Web: https://eerc.ru/paper

    Related research

    Keywords: Russia; valence; policy divergence; candidate equilibrium; median voter;

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    Cited by:
    1. Ashworth, Scott & Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 2009. "Elections with platform and valence competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 191-216, September.

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