The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies
AbstractA government may adopt extreme policies (policies lying outside the interval between the ideal points of the political parties) for electoral purposes. It can benefit when a change in policy is costly and when the opposing party cannot commit to maintaining the status quo.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 94-95-23.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 1995
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.
ELECTIONS; POLITICAL SYSTEMS;
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