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The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies

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Author Info

  • Glazer, A.
  • Konrad, K.A.

Abstract

A government may adopt extreme policies (policies lying outside the interval between the ideal points of the political parties) for electoral purposes. It can benefit when a change in policy is costly and when the opposing party cannot commit to maintaining the status quo.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 94-95-23.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:94-95-23

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords: ELECTIONS; POLITICAL SYSTEMS;

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Cited by:
  1. Egil Matsen & Øystein Thøgersen, 2010. "Habit formation, strategic extremism, and debt policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 165-180, October.
  2. Epstein, Gil S., 2006. "Extremism within the Family," IZA Discussion Papers 2199, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Schultz, Christian, 2002. "Policy biases with voters' uncertainty about the economy and the government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 487-506, March.
  4. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2005. "Lobbying and Compromise," CESifo Working Paper Series 1413, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Elie Appelbaum, 2006. "Strategic extremism," Working Papers 2006_12, York University, Department of Economics.
  6. Jan K. Brueckner & Amihai Glazer, 2006. "Urban Extremism," Working Papers 050620, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  7. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2007. "Political extremism in the presence of a free rider problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 31-40, October.
  8. Elie Appelbaum, 2004. "Union militancy and the probability of strikes," Working Papers 2004_4, York University, Department of Economics.
  9. Kimiko Terai, 2009. "Electoral control over policy-motivated candidates and their policy biases," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 43-64, January.
  10. Elie Appelbaum, 2008. "Extremism: Root Causes and Strategic Use in Conflicts," Working Papers 2008_02, York University, Department of Economics.

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