The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies
AbstractA government may adopt extreme policies (policies lying outside the interval between the ideal points of the political parties) for electoral purposes. It can benefit when a change in policy is costly and when the opposing party cannot commit to maintaining the status quo.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 108 (1998)
Issue (Month): 451 (November)
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