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The scoring rules in an endogenous election

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  • Bernardo Moreno

    ()

  • M. Socorro Puy

    ()

Abstract

Plurality rule, when applied to a fixed agenda setting, is mostly criticized from being capable of choosing an alternative considered as worst by a strict majority. In this paper we consider an endogenous agenda setting with no more than three alternatives. In those equilibria where the Condorcet winner enters the contest, we show, in direct contrast to the fixed agenda case, that Plurality rule is the only scoring rule which always elects the Condorcet winner.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-005-0034-6
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 25 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 115-125

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:25:y:2005:i:1:p:115-125

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  1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O. & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 190-218, March.
  2. Bernardo Moreno & M. Puy, 2009. "Plurality Rule Works In Three-Candidate Elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 145-162, August.
  3. Dominique LEPELLEY & Vincent MERLIN, 1998. "Choix social positionnel et principe majoritaire," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 51, pages 29-48.
  4. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
  5. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
  6. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-37, July.
  7. Moulin,Hervi, 1991. "Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521424585, 9.
  8. Saari, Donald G. & Valognes, Fabrice, 1999. "The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 429-456, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsatz, 2007. "Size Approval Voting," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 0703, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
    • Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "Size Approval Voting," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Bernardo Moreno & M. Puy, 2009. "Plurality Rule Works In Three-Candidate Elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 145-162, August.
  3. James Green-Armytage, 2014. "Strategic voting and nomination," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 111-138, January.

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