This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics EHLERS, Lars
WEYMARK, John A.
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have established a number of theorems that demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of these impossibility theorems.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number
2001-30.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2001Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-30Contact details of provider: Postal: CP 6128, Succ. Centre-Ville, Montr�al, Qu�bec, H3C 3J7 Phone: (514) 343-6540 Fax: (514) 343-5831 Web page: http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Sharon BREWER).
Keywords: axiomatic social choice ; candidate stability ; litical economy ; voting ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2001.
"Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 374-394, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Wilson, Robert, 1972.
"Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eraslan, H.Hulya & McLennan, Andrew, 2004.
"Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 29-54, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001.
"Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-37, July.
Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002.
"Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains ,"
Working Papers
0206, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Quesada Antonio, 2002.
"From social choice functions to dictatorial social welfare functions ,"
Economics Bulletin ,
Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(15), pages 1-6.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009.
"Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings ,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
[Downloadable!]
Geoffroy de Clippel & Camelia Bejan, 2009.
"No Profitable Decomposition in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems ,"
Working Papers
2009-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2007.
"Arrow's Theorem for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences ,"
Research Memoranda
043, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
Carmelo Rodr?uez-?varez, 2001.
"Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences ,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
492.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo, 2003.
"Candidate Stability And Voting Correspondences ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
666, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2006.
"Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences ,"
Social Choice and Welfare ,
Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 545-570, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009.
"Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott ,"
Working Papers
2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Ehlers,Lars & Storcken,Ton, 2001.
"Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments ,"
Research Memoranda
006, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
EHLERS, Lars & STORCKEN, Ton, 2002.
"Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments ,"
Cahiers de recherche
2002-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
[Downloadable!] Ehlers, L. & Storcken, T., 2002.
"Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments ,"
Cahiers de recherche
2002-03, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
[Downloadable!]
Access and
download statistics Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-29.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .