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Abstract

A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have established a number of theorems that demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of these impossibility theorems.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/382
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2001-30.

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Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-30

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Postal: CP 6128, Succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal, Québec, H3C 3J7
Phone: (514) 343-6540
Fax: (514) 343-5831
Web page: http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca
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Related research

Keywords: axiomatic social choice; candidate stability; litical economy; voting;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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1. Eraslan, H.Hulya & McLennan, Andrew, 2004. "Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 29-54, July.
2. Grether, David M. & Plott, Charles R., . "Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem," Working Papers 271, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
   
   • Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 143-49, January.
3. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2001. "Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 374-394, December.
4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-37, July.
   
   • DUTTA, Bhaskar & JACKSON, Matthew O. & LE BRETON, Michel, 1998. "Strategic candidacy and voting procedures," CORE Discussion Papers 1999011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
5. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.

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Cited by:

1. EHLERS, Lars & STORCKEN, Ton, 2002. "Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments," Cahiers de recherche 2002-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
   
   • Ehlers,Lars & Storcken,Ton, 2001. "Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments," Research Memoranda 006, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
2. Eraslan, H.Hulya & McLennan, Andrew, 2004. "Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 29-54, July.
3. Geoffroy de Clippel & Camelia Bejan, 2009. "No Profitable Decomposition in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems," Working Papers 2009-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
   
   • de Clippel, Geoffroy & Bejan, Camelia, 2011. "No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1995-2012, September.
4. Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0206, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Sep 2003.
   
   • Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," IDEI Working Papers 143, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2003.
5. Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo, 2003. "Candidate Stability And Voting Correspondences," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 666, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
   
   • Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2006. "Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 545-570, December.
   • Carmelo Rodr?uez-?varez, 2001. "Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 492.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
6. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
7. Ehlers, Lars & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Arrow's Theorem for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Research Memoranda 043, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
8. Samejima, Yusuke, 2005. "Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 190-195, August.
9. Priscilla Man & Shino Takayama, 2012. "A Unifying Impossibility Theorem," Discussion Papers Series 448, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
10. Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings," ISER Discussion Paper 0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
11. Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 152-175, September.

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