Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule

Contents:

Author Info

  • Masashi Umezawa

    ()

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-008-0351-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

    Volume (Year): 33 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 1 (June)
    Pages: 151-158

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:1:p:151-158

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm

    Order Information:
    Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    2. Shin Sato, 2008. "On strategy-proof social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 331-343, August.
    3. Peleg,Bezalel, 2008. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521074650, April.
    4. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2000. "A trade-off result for preference revelation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 129-141, August.
    5. Bandyopadhyay, Taradas, 1983. "Manipulation of non-imposed, non-oligarchic, non-binary group decision rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 69-73.
    6. Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching, 2002. "Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 569-580.
    7. Bandyopadhyay, Taradas, 1983. "Multi-valued decision rules and coalitional non-manipulability : Two possibility theorems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 37-44.
    8. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 275-275, February.
    9. Barbera, Salvador, 1977. "Manipulation of social decision functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 266-278, August.
    10. Demange, Gabrielle, 1987. "Nonmanipulable Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1057-74, September.
    11. Bandyopadhyay, Taradas, 1983. "Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 359-363, April.
    12. Feldman, Allan, 1979. "Manipulation and the Pareto rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 473-482, December.
    13. Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1973. "On the stability of sincere voting situations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(6), pages 558-574, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Ján Palguta, 2011. "Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 324-345, November.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:33:y:2009:i:1:p:151-158. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.