Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 33 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
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