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Majority voting leads to unanimity

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Author Info
Geir Asheim ()
Carl Claussen ()
Tore Nilssen ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-006-0042-5
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 35 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
Pages: 91-110
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2006:i:1:p:91-110

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Related research
Keywords: Majority voting; Core; Cooperative game theory; D72; C71;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1994. "When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions," Working Papers 94-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D.Marc Kilgour, 2003. "Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters," Working Papers 2003.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Sanjay Jain & Sharun W. Mukand, 2003. "Redistributive Promises and the Adoption of Economic Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 256-264, March. [Downloadable!]
  4. Saint-Paul, G., 1993. "On the Political Economy of Labor Market Flexibility," DELTA Working Papers 93-02, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    Other versions:
  5. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 1996. "Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 397-417.
  6. Sebastian Edwards & Daniel Lederman, 1998. "The Political Economy of Unilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Chile," NBER Working Papers 6510, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. C. A. Claussen, 2002. "On the Dynamic Consistency of Reform and Compensation Schemes," Journal of Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 5(3), pages 133-144, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. David P. Baron, 2001. "Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 47-89, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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