Monotonicity of power and power measures
AbstractMonotonicity is commonly considered an essential requirement for power measures; violation of local monotonicity or related postulates supposedly disqualifies an index as a valid yardstick for measuring power. This paper questions if such claims are really warranted. In the light of features of real-world collective decision making such as coalition formation processes, ideological affinities, a priori unions, and strategic interaction, standard notions of monotonicity are too narrowly defined. A power measure should be able to indicate that power is non-monotonic in a given dimension of playersâ€™ resources if â€“ given a decision environment and plausible assumptions about behaviour â€“ itis non-monotonic. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.
Volume (Year): 56 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
Power measures; monotonicity; voting;
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