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Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?

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    Abstract

    Much of the EU institution literature deals with the distribution of voting power in the Council and European Parliament. The increasingly sophisticated models on EU decision making tend to overlook issues pertaining agenda formation and control in various decision making bodies. This article argues that agenda control is extremely important in all collective decision making bodies. Indeed, agenda control may render the voting power distribution issue largely irrelevant.

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    File URL: http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/download/id/77/type/attachment
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): 4 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 005-017

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    Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2010_005

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    Related research

    Keywords: Agenda control; amendment procedure; no-show paradox; successive procedure;

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    1. Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
    2. Turnovec, Frantisek, 1997. "Monotonicity of Power Indices," East European Series 41, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
    4. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    5. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1984. "Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control," Working Papers 524, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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