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Unitary, Divisional, And Matrix Forms As Political Governance Systems

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Author Info
Andrew Whitford ()
Abstract

In this study I reassess a set of fundamental organization forms (unitary, divisional, and matrix) as agenda-setting and political governance systems. My method of analysis is based on how political scientists study agendas in committees. Specifically, I first recount that moving from a functional (unitary) to a product-line (divisional) structure increases the types of conflict referred from lower to higher levels of the hierarchy, but does not increase the amount of conflict referred. I then show that moving from a product-line to a matrix structure increases the amount and the types of conflict referred to higher levels of the hierarchy; that it is possible in matrix forms that no conflict is resolved at the lowest levels of the hierarchy; and, that accountability is reduced for those who are able to refer conflict. The study reveals implications for matrix forms that derive from this view of organizations as agenda-setting and political governance systems. This analysis fits with the recent history of matrix forms in a variety of organizations. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10997-006-9009-y
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Management & Governance.

Volume (Year): 10 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 435-454
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:10:y:2006:i:4:p:435-454

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102940

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Related research
Keywords: agenda-setting; authority; conflict resolution; hierarchy; matrix; D23; L22; L23;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hammond, Thomas H & Thomas, Paul A, 1989. "The Impossibility of a Neutral Hierarchy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 155-84, Spring.
  3. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Meagher, Kieron J., 2003. "Generalizing incentives and loss of control in an optimal hierarchy: the role of information technology," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 273-280, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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