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Monotonicity of power and power measures

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  • Manfred J. Holler
  • Stefan Napel

Abstract

Monotonicity is commonly considered an essential requirement for power measures; violation of local monotonicity or related postulates supposedly disqualifies an index as a valid yardstick for measuring power. This paper questions if such claims are really warranted. In the light of features of real-world collective decision making such as coalition formation processes, ideological affinities, a priori unions, and strategic interaction, standard notions of monotonicity are too narrowly defined. A power measure should be able to indicate that power is non-monotonic in a given dimension of players’ resources if – given a decision environment and plausible assumptions about behaviour – itis non-monotonic. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 56 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2_2 (02)
Pages: 93-111

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:56:y:2004:i:2_2:p:93-111

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

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  1. Napel,S. & Widgren,M., 2002. "Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach," Working Papers 345, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  2. Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D.Marc Kilgour, 2003. "Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters," Working Papers 2003.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Manfred Holler & Stefan Napel, 2005. "Local monotonicity of power: Axiom or just a property?," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(5), pages 637-647, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Napel, Stefan & Nohn, Andreas & Alonso-Meijide, José Maria, 2012. "Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 247-257.
  2. Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali, 2006. "On the Coleman indices of voting power," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 171(1), pages 273-289, May.
  3. Alpern, Steve & Gal, Shmuel & Solan, Eilon, 2010. "A sequential selection game with vetoes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 1-14, January.
  4. Chris Geller & Jamie Mustard & Ranya Shahwan, 2007. "Focused Power: Experimental Manifestation of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index," Economics Series 2007_13, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  5. J. Alonso-Meijide & C. Bowles & M. Holler & S. Napel, 2009. "Monotonicity of power in games with a priori unions," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 17-37, January.
  6. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2012. "A Violation of Monotonicity in a Noncooperative Setting," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2012-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  7. Geller, Chris R. & Mustard, Jamie & Shahwan, Ranya, 2013. "Focused power: Experiments, the Shapley-Shubik power index, and focal points," Economics Discussion Papers 2013-42, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

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