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Monotonicity of power in games with a priori unions

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  • J. Alonso-Meijide

    ()

  • C. Bowles

    ()

  • M. Holler

    ()

  • S. Napel

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-008-9114-2
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 66 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 17-37

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:66:y:2009:i:1:p:17-37

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

Related research

Keywords: Monotonicity; Voting power; Coalitional values; Coalition structures; A priori unions; C71;

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References

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  1. Hamiache, Gerard, 1999. "A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 281-305, May.
  2. A. Laruelle & F. Valenciano, 2004. "On The Meaning Of Owen--Banzhaf Coalitional Value In Voting Situations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(2_2), pages 113-123, 02.
  3. Manfred J. Holler & Stefan Napel, 2004. "Monotonicity of power and power measures," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(2_2), pages 93-111, 02.
  4. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September.
  5. J. Alonso-Meijide & F. Carreras & M. Fiestras-Janeiro, 2005. "The Multilinear Extension and the Symmetric Coalition Banzhaf Value," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 111-126, 09.
  6. Manfred Holler & Stefan Napel, 2005. "Local monotonicity of power: Axiom or just a property?," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 38(5), pages 637-647, January.
  7. Winter, Eyal, 1992. "The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 132-144, January.
  8. Amer, Rafael & Carreras, Francese & Gimenez, Jose Miguel, 2002. "The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: an axiomatic characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 45-54, January.
  9. Dan Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2005. "Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 485-506, December.
  10. A. Laruelle & F. Valenciano, 2004. "On The Meaning Of Owen–Banzhaf Coalitional Value In Voting Situations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 113-123, 04.
  11. Leech, Dennis & Leech, Robert, 2004. "Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 718, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  12. Vazquez-Brage, M. & van den Nouweland, A. & Garcia-Jurado, I., 1997. "Owen's coalitional value and aircraft landing fees," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 273-286, October.
  13. Turnovec, Frantisek, 1997. "Monotonicity of Power Indices," East European Series 41, Institute for Advanced Studies.
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Cited by:
  1. Harald Badinger & Monika Mühlböck & Elisabeth Nindl & Wolf Heinrich Reuter, 2013. "Theoretical vs. Empirical Power Indices: Do Preferences Matter?," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp153, Vienna University of Economics, Department of Economics.
  2. Napel, Stefan & Nohn, Andreas & Alonso-Meijide, José Maria, 2012. "Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 247-257.
  3. Elena Mielcová, 2010. "The Uncertainty in Voting Power: The Case of the Czech Parliament 1996–2004," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 201-222, June.

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