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Proximity in coalition building

Author

Listed:
  • Julien Reynaud

    (European Central Bank)

  • Fabien Lange

    (Budapest Tech)

  • Lukasz Gatarek

    (European Central Bank)

  • Christian Thimann

    (European Central Bank)

Abstract

Voting power methodology offers insights to understand coalition building in collective decision making. This paper proposes a new measure of voting power inspired from Banzhaf (1965) accounting for the proximity between voters by capturing how often they appear in winning coalitions together. Using this proximity index, we introduce a notion of relative linkages among coalition participants as determinant of coalition building. We propose an application to the governance structure of the International Monetary Fund, with linkages being represented by bilateral volumes of trade between voters. The results are able to explain several important features of the functioning of this particular voting body, and may be useful for other applications in international politics.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Reynaud & Fabien Lange & Lukasz Gatarek & Christian Thimann, 2007. "Proximity in coalition building," Working Paper Series 0808, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management, revised Jul 2008.
    • Handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0808
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Julien Reynaud & Fabien Lange & Łukasz Gątarek & Christian Thimann, 2011. "Proximity in Coalition Building," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, vol. 3(3), pages 111-132, September.
    2. László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Measuring voting power: The paradox of new members vs the null player axiom," Working Paper Series 0903, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting power index; coalition building; International Monetary Fund; linkage; proximity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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