Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 25 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
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- Dan Felsenthal & Moshé Machover & William Zwicker, 1998. "The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 83-116, January.
- Bolger, E M, 1986. "Power Indices for Multicandidate Voting Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 175-86.
- MoshÊ Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 1997. "Ternary Voting Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 335-351.
- Lindner, Ines & Machover, Moshe, 2004. "L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 37-49, January.
- André Casajus & Helfried Labrenz & Tobias Hiller, 2009. "Majority shareholder protection by variable qualified majority rules," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 9-18, August.
- Alexander Zaigraev & Serguei Kaniovski, 2012. "Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 89-112, January.
- Nicolas Houy & William S. Zwicker, 2013. "The geometry of voting power : weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids," Working Papers halshs-00772953, HAL.
- Abraham Diskin & Moshe Koppel, 2010. "Voting power: an information theory approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 105-119, January.
- J. Alonso-Meijide & C. Bowles & M. Holler & S. Napel, 2009. "Monotonicity of power in games with a priori unions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 17-37, January.
- Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2009. "A note on measuring voters’ responsibility," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4296, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Dennis Leech, 2013. "Power indices in large voting bodies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 61-79, April.
- Ines Lindner, 2012. "Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano: Voting and collective decision-making," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 161-179, January.
- Houy, Nicolas & Zwicker, William S., 2014. "The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 7-16.
- Michela Chessa & Vito Fragnelli, 2011. "Embedding Classical Indices in the FP Family," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 289-305, November.
- Diego Varela & Javier Prado-Dominguez, 2012. "Negotiating the Lisbon Treaty: Redistribution, Efficiency and Power Indices," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(2), pages 107-124, July.
- Sascha Kurz & Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel & and Matthias Weber, 2014. "Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow's Power Index Research," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-058/I, Tinbergen Institute.
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