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Voting Rules and Budget Allocation in an Enlarged EU

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Author Info
Heikki Kauppi () (Department of Economics, University of Helsinki)
Mika Widgrén () (Department of Economics, Turku School of Economics)

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Abstract

EU declares to provide support for the rural and poor regions of its member states. However, recent research shows that past EU budget allocations (in EU-15) can be attributed to measures of the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers deciding on the bulk of EU spending. A standard power measure alone can explain about 85% of the variance of the past EU budget shares, while, if stable coalition patterns among member countries are taken into account, power can explain at least 95% of the budget allocation. In this paper we use such estimates to predict EU budget shares after the eastern enlargement. According to our estimates eastern enlargement has large effects on the budget receipts of the incumbent member states. Moreover, whether the voting rules are based on the Nice Treaty (NT) or the Constitutional Treaty (CT) makes a difference for most member states. Many member states would be worse off under CT than under NT.

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Paper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2.

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Length: 27
Date of creation: Apr 2006
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Handle: RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp2

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Related research
Keywords: EU budget; voting power; Constitutional Treaty; Treaty of Nice;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Anderson, Kym & Tyers, Rodney, 1993. "Implications of EC Expansion for European Agricultural Policies, Trade and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 829, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Richard E. Baldwin & Joseph F. Francois & Richard Portes, 1997. "The costs and benefits of eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and central Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 12(24), pages 125-176, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Baldwin, Richard & Berglöf, Erik & Giavazzi, Francesco & Widgrén, Mika, 2000. "EU Reforms for Tomorrow’s Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 2623, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Baldwin, Richard & Widgrén, Mika, 2004. "Winners and Losers Under Various Dual Majority Rules for the EU Council of Ministers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Baldwin, Richard & Widgrén, Mika, 2005. "The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 4954, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Dan S Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-20, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Leech, Dennis, 2002. " Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-64, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgrén, Mika, 2005. "Voting Rules and Budget Allocation in an Enlarged EU," CEPR Discussion Papers 5134, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "Voting Rules and Budget Allocation in an Enlarged EU," Discussion Papers 2, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
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