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The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget

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  • Heikki Kauppi

    (Department of Economics, University of Turku)

  • Mika Widgrén

    (Department of Economics, Turku School of Economics)

Abstract

It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states are able to establish rules or contracts that restrict the budget allocation in advance. In the current status quo, France and Spain are the clearest winners of these restrictions, while Austria, Finland and Sweden, not to mention the new member states, suffer largest losses.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 45.

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Length: 29
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp45

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Keywords: EU budget; voting power;

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  1. Kandogan, Yener, 2000. "Political economy of eastern enlargement of the European Union: Budgetary costs and reforms in voting rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 685-705, November.
  2. Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2004. "What determines EU decision making? Needs, power or both?," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 19(39), pages 221-266, 07.
  3. Napel, Stefan & Widgren, Mika, 2004. "The Inter-institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Discussion Papers 944, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
  4. Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2008. "Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts?," Discussion Papers 38, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  5. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September.
  6. Charles B. Blankart & Christian Kirchner, 2003. "The Deadlock of the EU Budget: An Economic Analysis of Ways In and Ways Out," CESifo Working Paper Series 989, CESifo Group Munich.
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