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Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room Explaining EU Bydget Receipts?

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Author Info
Heikki Kauppi
Mika Widgrén

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Abstract

ABSTRACT : The member states have self-interested objectives and they use their voting power in the Council of Ministers (CM) to maximize their shares from the EU budget, whereas European Parliament (EP) uses its power to support benevolent objectives and equality between member states. Given the current decision procedures of the EU, EP has effective power on non-compulsory expenditure covering structural spending, but not on compulsory expenditure consisting mainly of agricultural spending. We use this fact to assess how the assumed benevolent objectives of EP turn into member states´ budget receipts in a power politics based model.

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Paper provided by The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy in its series Discussion Papers with number 1161.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 06 Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:rif:dpaper:1161

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Widgren, Mika, 1995. " Probabilistic Voting Power in the EU Council: The Cases of Trade Policy and Social Regulation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(2), pages 345-56, June.
  3. Baldwin, Richard & Widgrén, Mika, 2004. "Winners and Losers Under Various Dual Majority Rules for the EU Council of Ministers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Abdul G. Noury & Gérard Roland, 2002. "More power to the European Parliament?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 279-319, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dan S Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-20, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.

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