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Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application

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  • Matthew Gould

    ()

  • Matthew D. Rablen

    ()

Abstract

We develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Three equity concepts are proposed, ex-ante (procedural) equity, ex-post (outcome) equity and regional equity. The last two concepts are consistent with a new square-root rule on the probability of council membership, but no CVG can meet all three concepts. We apply our framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to reform it.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University in its series CEDI Discussion Paper Series with number 13-07.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edb:cedidp:13-07

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  1. Madeleine Hosli & Rebecca Moody & Bryan O’Donovan & Serguei Kaniovski & Anna Little, 2011. "Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 163-187, July.
  2. Axel Dreher & Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen & James Vreeland, 2014. "The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 51-83, January.
  3. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
  4. Freixas, Josep, 2012. "Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 89-99.
  5. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2004. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," CESifo Working Paper Series 1347, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Dan S Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-20, 08.
  7. Manno, Catherine Senf, 1966. "Selective Weighted Voting in the UN General Assembly: Rationale and Methods," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(01), pages 37-62, December.
  8. Josep Freixas & William S. Zwicker, 2003. "Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 399-431, December.
  9. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1996. "Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair?," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1996022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  10. Iain McLean & Alistair McMillan & Dennis Leech, 2005. "Duverger's Law, Penrose's Power Index and the Unity of the UK," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53, pages 457-476, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2014. "Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency," CESifo Working Paper Series 4818, CESifo Group Munich.

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