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Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency

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  • Matthew Gould
  • Matthew D. Rablen

Abstract

Twenty years of negotiations over reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are yet to bear fruit. We use recent advances in the theory of a-priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the “structural reforms” contained within eleven current reform proposals, and the separate effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only two reform proposals – the EU acting as a single entity, or a weakening of the veto power for permanent members – robustly dominate the status quo against our measures of equity and efficiency. Several proposals may actually worsen the issues they ostensibly claim to resolve.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4818.

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Date of creation: 2014
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4818

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Keywords: United Nations; United Nations Security Council; United Nations Security Council reform; equity; efficiency; voting power; square-root rule;

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  1. Josep Freixas & William S. Zwicker, 2003. "Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 399-431, December.
  2. Axel Dreher & Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen & James Vreeland, 2014. "The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 51-83, January.
  3. Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen, 2013. "Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application," CESifo Working Paper Series 4519, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Manno, Catherine Senf, 1966. "Selective Weighted Voting in the UN General Assembly: Rationale and Methods," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(01), pages 37-62, December.
  5. Dan S Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-20, 08.
  6. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Computation of Power Indices," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 644, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  7. Freixas, Josep, 2012. "Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 89-99.
  8. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
  9. J. Bilbao & J. Fernández & A. Losada & J. López, 2000. "Generating functions for computing power indices efficiently," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 191-213, December.
  10. Madeleine Hosli & Rebecca Moody & Bryan O’Donovan & Serguei Kaniovski & Anna Little, 2011. "Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 163-187, July.
  11. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "The Use Of Coleman'S Power Indices To Inform The Choice Of Voting Rule With Reference To The Imf Governing Body And The Eu Council Of Ministers," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 645, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  12. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2010. "Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 221-243, July.
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